Egyptians living abroad want their right to vote!

The following text was written for the petition I lauched for asking to the High Council of Armed Forces of Egypt to reconsider their decision of deniying the right to vote for Egyptians living abroad. If you are an Egyptian living abroad and feel concerned about the denial of your rights, feel free to sign the petition here and share it with your contacts.

Indeed, The Egypt’s Military Council, in charge of leading the country since February 11th 2011 after putting an end to 30 years of Mubarak’s autocratic regime, decided to deprive Egyptians abroad from their right to vote. The Egyptian diaspora represents 4 million people living in 139 countries. Their rights as citizens were denied to them for the very arbitrary reason of the possibility of their votes being “sold” to non-Egyptian interests. The Egyptian diaspora is fully part of Egypt, and the Egyptians living abroad are therefore asking for their rights as citizen to be respected.

To: the High Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt

We, Egyptians living abroad, consider ourselves as fully Egyptians.Our reasons for migration are very different from one person to another, and very few of us consider living outside of Egypt as a deep aspiration. For many of us, it was merely a necessity: some had to migrate to look for a better living, sometimes being simply denied the opportunity to live decently in Egypt under the 30 years of autocratic regime, some others were forced to look for a safe place for they were haunted for their subversive opinions, some even work from abroad for the improvement of their country of origin (in International Organizations for example), some were also born abroad from Egyptian parents. What we have all in common is our love for Egypt and our concern for the future of our country.

We consider the denial made to our right to vote, based on the enventuality that our votes might well be “bought” by foreign interests is not only discriminatory towards us, but is also against the principles of the New Egypt we all wish to see blossoming. Besides being based on an unjustified and subjective preconception, it also sends a strong message to Egyptians living abroad: “You are unworthy to Egypt”.

We are aware of the technical difficulty to coordinate polling stations in 139 countries, but we don’t consider it as a reason for the denial of our rights as citizens. Not only many countries offer to their diaspora the possibility to vote, thus proving it is possible, but also this would mean that a minor technical constraint is stronger than our noble principles of freedom, democracy and unity.

We urge the Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, Chairman of the High Council of Armed Forces of Egypt to consider our determination to participate to the political life of our country and to give us our right to vote, regardless of our country of residence.

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Dying of thirst in the middle of the Sea: a history of indifference

As war goes on in Libya, the flow of refugees to the neighbouring countries doesn’t stop. Estimations are difficult to do, but we know that besides the massive number (nearly one million) of foreign workers who left Libya at the beginning of the conflit and already went back to their country (let it be in Subsaharian Africa, North Africa or Asia), more than 150’000 Libyans crossed the frontiers with Tunisia, Egypt or Niger (for example nearly 40’000 Libyans have been quickly “absorbed” by the South Tunisian population , most of them hosted and provided in essential needs in Tunisian families although they are themselves in need, with such a fluency that even the International Organizations and the NGOs were amazed of the solidarity of the local population). A few thousands fled to Europe, generally through the Italian island of Lampedusa with their boats from Mistrata or other local ports. Men, women and children take board in overcrowded boats that sometimes fail in crossing the Mediterranean Sea and sink.

The sadest of these stories was reported by the guardian two days ago, about a boat that left Misrata with 72 refugees on board that came to visual contact with a NATO aircraft carrier, supposed to be the french Charles-de-Gaulle, and that made several attempts to drag attention (including a phone call to a Erithrean priest in Rome that alerted the italian coastguards that launched an alarm to urge any vessel in the neighbourhood of the boat of the refugees to rescue, following the law o the Sea that applies as well to military ships). Although these signals to the aircraft carrier and the two military planes/helicopters passing over the boat at low altitude, no help was given to the refugees. Ater the fuel tank emptied and the food and water stock finished, the boat drifted backwards towards Libya, and meanwhile 61 from the initial 72 people on bord died of hunger and thirst.

The NATO investigation is going on. Regardless of the details it will reveal, the conclusion will forever stay the same: 72 people escaped for saving their lives from the madness of war and 61 of them ended dying because of the indifference of those who were mobilized to protect them, because although they clearly saw them and have clearly received the signal of their presence, somewhere, the decision to not rescue them was taken. Let it be a dysfunctional  procedure or not, it is very likely that the ship’s company didn’t intend to let the refugees die but just weren’t keen to endorse the responsability of these 72 people. One can imagine they might well have thought the boat would have easily reached Lampedusa or any other Italian shore, letting to the staff on the ground take care of welcoming the refugees; in consequence they reached the conclusion that they can avoid dealing with a boat full of refugees. At every stage of the concerned hierarchy, then, there wasn’t the will – or the courage – to endorse the responsability of the migrants. Were simply the members of the staff of the aircraft carrier “afraid” to become a plateform used by Africans to reach Europe? After all, indifference to dramatic situations is sometimes no more than a shunning, a strategy to avoid the answers to the questions we fear.

If it is to be stated that, indeed, the aircraft carrier envolved in this event was the french Charles-de-Gaulles, it would become extremely revelant. France called for a freeze of the Schengen Agreement in order to close their frontiers to the Tunisian migrants given 6-months visas by the italian authorities, and the denial of assistance to the 72 refugees escaping Libya would be simply the continuation on sea of the official new French policy towards migrants. If the refugees were to be saved by the Charles-de-Gaulle, in stepping on the aircraft carrier, according to the International Law of the Sea, they would be considered as under the French law; in short France would have been forced to welcome the refugees, given the fact they cannot send them back to their country at war (a war to which France is participating). By letting the refugees on the Sea, thinking they’d continue to Lampedusa, they certainly hoped that the migrants would be welcomed by the Italian authorities. The question that remains would then be simple: were the members of the staff fully responsible of the decision of ignoring the refugees, or were they told/forced to ignore them?

Tunisian migrants of Lampedusa: France is shivering

During the last few weeks, Lampedusa was often quoted in European newspapers headlines. After the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, an increase in the number of Tunisian migrants reaching by boat Europe through the little Italian island at South of Sicily was observed. Reading the news, it looks almost like an invasion: how is Europe going to deal with this massive wave of migration? What is the appropriate thing to do? Issueing to the Tunisian migrants residence permits in the European Union, at the cost of encouraging more and more North Africans to cross the Mediterranean? Or send them back to their currently unstable homeland at the cost of having to face critics for treating African people without any sense of responsability or dignity after being life long partners of dictators such as Ben Ali or Gaddafi? Tunisian migrants, while waiting for the outcome of the debate over their fate, see themselves becoming a point of focus: journalists are almost as many as them in Lampedusa, protests of angry Italian are almost daily, Libyan migrants, escaping war, begin to arrive at the accomodation.

When finally Italy issued 22’000 3 months-visas to the migrants, allowing them to travel in Europe before to settle for a final destination, according to Schengen Agreement, a wave of panick sweeped all over Europe. France, where about 3/4 of the migrants plan to go, promptly reacted: first by stopping the trains between Vintimille (Italy) to France carrying migrants as well as Italian activists, then by calling for a temporary suspension of Schengen Agreement. Never in the history of European Union did one of the Member States ask for such a extraordinary measure. By acting so, France would threaten the unity of Europe, create a diplomatic conflict with another Member State, Italy, and deliberately get in the way of European economy, favorited by the open intra-European borders.

The Schengen Agreement defines itself which kind of circumstances allows a suspension of the Convention: when security of a Member State asks for it. To be able to ask for a suspension of the Schengen Agreement in order to prevent a massive migration from Tunisia, France normally should be able to demonstrate the direct link between the 22’000 migrants and security of the French territory.

As a physicist, I always felt confortable with demonstrations: in general, numbers lie much less than politicians. I tried to figure out how 22’000 people could threaten France’s security.  For the sake of the argument I assumed that 100% of the Tunisian migrants would try to settle in France; the French population would then increase by 0.03% = 3 Tunisians per 10’000 people. Each Tunisian has then to represent a significant change in the life of approximatively 3’300 people in France.

The impact of the Tunisian migrants cannot be as dramatic as depicted by politicians. Nevertheless, integrating them into national statistics is an easy way to show evaluate their contribution to France. For example, unemployment in France represents 9.6% of active population, and the 22’000 Tunisians would not even represent 0.01% of the active population, and more keen to work in the main understaffed sectors in France (catering/food industry, construction industry, etc). The median age of Tunisians in Tunisia is about 30 years in total and 29.6 years for men. The migrants of Lampedusa are in huge majority young men, perfectly healthy, so to say coming to Europe to work. Most of them speak French and come from rural regions of Tunisia, where the biggest part of the economy is provided by agriculture; it is to be noted that agriculture is the most understaffed sector in France.

So in the best case these Tunisians would be able to find a job and participate in France’s economical growth. French GDP per person was of 28’123 € in 2010. In the worst case they would not find any job and would benefit from the french social welfare (known as the Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA). The RSA is a monthly fare of 466.99 € per person (=5’603 € per year). Meaning that a negative impact of the 22’000 Tunisian migrants in France can be possible if and only if for one finding a job and producing a substantial yearly wealth of 28’123 € worth, there should be at least 6 Tunisians not finding jobs and costing each 5’603 € in social welfare.

In other words, unless the unemployment rate of the newcomers is higher than 85% their contribution to the French economy would be positive. A realistic scenario would admit an unemployment rate for Tunisian newcomers a bit above national rate, certainly around 20% during the first year. By closing their borders to Tunisian migrants and putting in question Schengen Agreement, France is, in consequence, depriving the national economy from a very welcome help. Not only the immediate needs in workers in some sectors where French people don’t want to work would be partly fulfilled, but also in a demographic point of view, their presence can only be a good thing for the aging French population (amongst the oldest in Europe with a serious deficit of young people, only two decades before the “Baby-Boomers” reach age of retirement). History even already shown us that there is nothing to fear from this migration: after all, after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutionnary chain reaction it induced in Eastern Europe, Romanians, Hungarians or Polish massively migrated; 20 years later, it is pretty clear that no invasion or negative concequence was observed in Western Europe.

There is certainly no reason to think that French authorities are not aware of these facts: for France, as well as for the rest of Europe, blocking the migration process could be painful more than anything else. The opposition to Tunisian migration can then only be ideological: fear from the Foreigners, from the unknown and misuse of this fear for electoral reasons. By calling to the suspension of the Schengen Agreement to avoid the Tunisian migrants and insinuating a revision should be undertaken, French President Sarkozy might well open the Pandora box.  At his own risks.

2011: Arab Spring, European Winter?

In a few decades, History books will mention 2011 as the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring. So far, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions may have not yet fully turned the two authoritarian states into democracies, but the first signs of democratization are encouraging. The outcome of the difficult phase through which Libya is passing is totally incertain; while the most optimist forecasts believe in a quiet transition by the National Transition Council in case Gaddafi forces are defeated, the most pessimist fear a long “Somalia-like” civil war. The Yemeni turmoil is weakening more and more Saleh regime and the Syrian protests are shaking Bashar Al-Assad inherited power more than ever did any of the political crisis the country has been through. The contamination to Iran and to sub-saharian African countries is often discussed by political analysts. North Africa and Middle-East changed for good, and with it global geopolitics. But what will History books say about year 2011 in Europe?

It might well be that 2011 will be remembered as the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe. What would have looked to be as a highly excentric assertion 5 years ago looks today more and more credible. The global financial crisis of 2008 has severely undermined the influence of Europe in the World, but also the sovereignty of European Nations and the social benefits of the European citizen. Instead of reinforcing the European economy, the Euro acted as a propagator of the deep crisis in Greece and Spain (among others) to the rest of Europe. In this context of local pauperization and global instability, withdrawal was the general reaction.

Until 2011, this withdrawal resulting in a radicalization of populations was thought to be a temporary trend, that would disappear once the effects of the crisis damped. But a recent event shows that on the contrary, it might be here to stay: for the first time since the end of the fall of the Berlin wall, an European nation included in its  “genetical code” (its constitution) the seeds of real anti-democratic principles. Hungary (and not anymore the Republic of Hungary) adopted on April 18th a new constitution limiting the independance of justice and increasing powers of the head of the State.

Are we overreacting by considering that the Hungarian new constitution is the first palpable step towards the collapse of democracy in Europe? It may be too soon to know. Nevertheless, the “Hungarian scenario” might well be only the first of its kind, where the rise of the nationalist right wing party first influenced national and european politics, before to imprint the Constitution. Other countries dominated by similar nationalist eurosceptic parties such as Slovakia or Romania are not excluded from following the same path.

The “Scandinavian model” was long considered to be one of the most evolved forms of democracy and the quintessence of social democracy. The first crack of the model might well have happened when the populist “True Fins” party won 39 seats (19%) at the Finnish Parliament on April 17th elections. Finland is one of the strongest member nations of the European Union and the previously unseen success of this euro-sceptic party  openly claiming they refuse the bailout to Portugal could be a real hindrance to European initiatives. What will happen to Europe the day the Euro-parliament will be full of euro-sceptics deputies?

The Hungarian case might well be the first regressive step in the internal governance of an European nation and the Finnish case the first one in the global governance inside the European Union. Optimists would say that Europe sad history throughout the 20th century will prevent totalitarism, as the consequences of this dramatic outcome is still extremely vivid in minds; Pessimists would just stick to the rough facts to conclude that what was unthinkable only a few years ago is already happening inside nations and inside Union. When more than a decade ago Austrian nationialist leader Jörg Haider (FPÖ) made his entry in the government, Austria seemed to be an isolated case; today, there is nothing unusual to the fact that right-wing leaders are in governments and parliaments. Majority of European citizen consider those parties as parties like any others.

Since the beginning of the economical crisis, the European ‘fortress’  denied more and more access to migrants from Africa and Asia and hardened the policies towards the existing European Muslim community. The fear of a negative anti-democratic impact of Islam is sweeping Europe from North to South and from East to West, ensuring the success of populist parties. So far Germany might well be the only European nation resisting more or less to the wave, but how long for? The radicalization even begins to disrupt national identities themselves, like we see in Belgium, with no government at its head since now one year, digging up the antagonism between Flemish and Welloon. The ‘worst case’ scenario might well be fulfilled if french presidential candidate Marine LePen is elected in 2012, because of France key influence in Europe.

If things keep going on this way, 2011 might well be remembered not only for the Arab Spring, but also for the European Winter.

Debate on Islam and secularitm: After 19th century ‘France des Lumières’, welcome to 21st century ‘France des Ténèbres’

Today, April 5th, took place in France a National debate on Islam and its place in the secular french Republic – more precisely, the initial debate on Islam in France that was renamed debate on secularism, in order to not stigmatize Islam and Muslims so pointedly. As often pointed out, President Sarkozy attempts with this debate to focus on Muslims in France issues in order to gather voices in prevision of the coming presidential elections. The different institutions representing the six most important religions in France (Catholicism, Protestancism, Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaim, Buddhism) declared they won’t participate, so did left parties. Even inside the presidential party and the government, the debate do not seem to be popular. Result: the announced “natinal debate” was finally no more than a “team meeting” of 10 on 30 ministers.

Were discussed: food in school cafeterias, mixity in hospitals, funding by State for the building of places of worship. The topics mentionned are all related to Islam in France: hallal meat, veil, the lack of mosques forcing Muslims to pray on friday in the streets. Given the context of North African unrest and more particularely of Libyan civil war, the migration trends towards Europe have slightly increased these last months: nothing massive, but due to improper instrumentalisation of the difficult situation faced on the Island of Lampedusa in Italy, Europe and particularly France lives with an rising fear of an invasion coming from South of the Mediteranean Sea, bringing with them poverty, unrest… and Islam. Thus, the debate on secularism and Islam of today was no more a debate: it was almost the first act of a trial where European Muslims and Migrant Muslims were accused of troubling a country that is explicitely insinuating it would look better and more prosperous without all those foreigners or foreigners’ children and all their too much visible foreign habits.

French President Sarkozy has been using and misusing Islam and Muslims in France since the beginning of his political career for electoral reasons. Today, the complete fiasco of his debate on Islam – he certainly expected to see the whole nation participating and thus enhancing a ‘snowball effect’ of explicit hatred towards Muslims that would have been beneficial to him – clearly shows to the world his weak posture: boycotted even by his own Prime Minister. After 3 hours of debate and 26 propositions (including a law on the “interdiction of prevailing religious beliefs on common rules regulating intereactions of public communities and individuals”), what is the real outcome? A further step towards narrow-mindedness of a center-right government shifting dangerously to extremist right-wing.

Nevertheless, if Sarkozy’s aggressive communication style and political skulduggery might have killed any hope for him to win the 2012 elections, his philosophy was deeply implemented in France these last years and is shared, consciously or unconsciously, on the minds of the majority of the French people. The people might well be annoyed by the President’s trick of using secularism for political reasons, still, when asked directly the questions that will be debated, a high percentage of people stick to quite islamophobic points of view, behind that same excuse of “secularism”: 42% of French consider Islam as a threat and 55% think Muslims are too much visible in France. When the French Minister of interior newly appointed Claude Guéant (life long Sarkozy’s ‘âme damnée‘, like we say in french) says that “The increase of the number of Muslims in France [...] is a problem”, there is merely none but the Muslims themselves or some dedicated associations (SOS Racism, MRAP) seem to be shocked or even paying attention to what one or two decades ago would have caused a French Minister to resign due to popular pressure. Last time a French ruler was pronouncing similar words, it was the General Pétain under the Vichy regime, talking about the Jews.

Shame for a country that deteriorated from nineteenth century “France des Lumières” (France of Enlightment) to twenty-first century “France des Ténèbres” (France of Darkness).

Muslims in Europe: more than 4 decades of democratic experience

Europe has always seen itself as the continent of origin of democracy. Because of the historical context in France at the time of the Revolution, democracy in Europe is deeply secular and rejects any intersection of religion and politics. So when Muslims in Europe bagan to participate on the political scene, there is only one concern that was expressed everywhere by European non-muslims: is democracy and Islam two compatible set of values? Can it be that one person claims at the same time being muslim (not only in the very private sphere but also publically) and democratic? Is the acceptance of Islam in the public sphere a danger for democracy?

The current events in the Arab World is a very clear proof that Islam and democracy are compatible. But there is also another proof: in analyzing the History of the last half century of Muslim migration waves in Europe, it is extremely clear that Muslims in Europe have always been dealing with the rest of the society through democratic means.

How have been Muslims in Europe acting democratic during the last half century?

During the second half of the twentieth century, Europe faced a major social change when, after decolonization, migrants arrived from Africa and Asia in waves. To each european country its specific history, hence its specific migrations. If we try to stay limited to muslim migrants (for the purpose of this article): Indian-Pakistanese in UK, Maghrebi-West and Central African in France, Moroccan in Spain, Tunisian in Italy, Turkish in Germany, etc. We can also add Bosniac and Albanese/Kosova migrants at the end of the twentieth century; for example Switzerland alone hosts third of the entire Kosova diaspora. Of course those are only basic trends and do not account of the full migration profiles. Each european country had its own policy in dealing with migration that evolved through decades, for better or worse. One has to distinguish here between two “extreme” cases:

• the British case : the State interfers as less as possible in internal affairs of the community, providing them even the option to solve certain type of conflicts in front of a Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT)
• the French case : the State wishes to merge as much as possible all communities into one unique entity, the Republic, bound by common values, summerized as follows: “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité“

Between these two extreme cases a significant number of variations are found. Anyway. What is interesting is that these migrants, that started more or less arriving in Europe in the 60′s, didn’t provide to the economy only labour vs. money: they established in Europe, got married (not necessarely with somebody from the same cultural background), raised children. If not the parents, the children, at least, acquired the citizenship of the “host” country, what enabled them, when reaching 18+, to vote and be actively part of the civil life. Having been in european schools, being introduced to european economy as workers and speaking in general the language of the host country (english, french, german, etc) much better than the language of the country of origin, it seemed to them very natural that they will build their life and career in Europe as fully Europeans.

What is interesting here is that muslim migrants children born in Europe remained quite attached to their roots and origins, although being fully conscious of being european. Many of them also kept a tight bound with Islam. Unlike the parents who felt they were whatsoever “from abroad”, their sons and daughters called for their rights to be guaranted. As the various constitutions were giving the same rights to all citizens, regardless of their religion, they asked for equality and for being given the opportunity to evolve through the civil life in a way that wouldn’t hurt their convictions. This covers topics as different as the end of discrimination in the labour market, authaurizations for building enough mosques for welcoming all the faithfuls, the availability at school restaurants of hallah meat for the children (basic “day-to-day life” rights) but also political rights through representation in classical political parties, visibility in the medias or recognition of colonial crimes (more or less: the right to be recognized as part of the identity of the country). On the other hand, the civil society/established powers asked to this European-Muslim generation to insert themselves as much as possible into the existing structures and follow as much as possible the existing laws, like for example accepting that the secularity of laws requires from them concessions on the dress code when working in public sector or sticking to the idea of the prevalence of the national laws on the Sharia. These two flows of demands meet in a point where they balance. The exact location of this balance point depends first on the integration policy the state applies (like the british case and french case seen above), but also of the socio-economical profile of the communities (number, cultral background, average education level, distribution over cities, etc). Generally the European-Muslims are represented by two main trends: those who believe only in assimilating totally in the “host” society by erasing all what makes them different and those who, although they want to be fully recognized as Europeans, do not want to be forced to let aside their religious and cultural specificity.

It is to notice that whatever the demands are, the European-Muslims, as citizens born in democratic countries and raised in the idea that their parents migrated to offer them an auspicious background for a better living, are claiming and asking for recognition of their rights following democratic procedures. They generally take form of:

• peaceful protests (for example La Marche des Beurs in France in 1983)
• intensive involvment in associations not specifically islamic (like for example SOS Racisme, Les Indigènes de la République, workers syndicates in UK, Turkish secular associations in Germany, political parties, etc)
• foundation of islamic institutions initiated by the community itself (Muslim Council of Britain, Islamic Council of Netherlands, etc) or initiated by the government (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman)
• active participation into the democratic debate through mediatic coverage (like the islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan or the antiracism activist Malek Boutih)
• petitions (against dismissal of employees for religious reasons)
• trials (asking for a space for prayer on the work place, recognition of a discrimination case, etc)
• boycott campaigns (brands not specifying clearly the use of prohibited food in some products)
• assiociative mutual help (when politics do not help): actions for homeless, youth educators to prevent violence, social integration through sports and art, etc
• providing private services in agreement with muslim values, with the agreement of european governments: hallal food providers, islamic banking, private schools, etc

There is also a unique but interesting case of a muslim political party in UK, Hizb et-Tahrir, clearly extremist in its points of view but in the same time “fairly” participating on the political scene by debating (the same way a right-winged political party is considered to be democratic because it accepts the “rules of the game”). All these democratic procedures have in common to be non-violent. Of course, there is also some rare cases of violent acts, although quite limited compared to the number of peaceful initiatives. These acts although restricted in number could be seen as the beginning of a breakdown between the European-Muslims  and the rest of the society: assassination of Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands, the Khaled Kelkal’s terrorist acts, London and Madrid bombings, french suburban areas unrest events of 2005, violent treats after the Muhammad (SWS) cartoons controversy. These violent acts are most of the time tightly entangled with the international context such as the Algerian civil war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Gulf Wars or of course the 11th of September. One has to not confuse between the violent political acts and the criminality and urban violence witnessed in poor stratum of the society and working-poor class, for the latter are not political movements; they might express loudly the despair of a community banned by the rest of the society and living difficult conditions (living in poor suburban areas, being jobless).

But whatsoever, besides those very rare examples, the European-Muslims mostly follow existing laws or fight within the democratic frame for their rights. Indeed, they are extremely present in the front line, and, it has to be pointed, if they are present through the activities listed above, they never pressured through powerful lobbies.

As a consequence, the long-debated question of the compatibility of democracy with Islam is quite non-revelant: European-Muslims have been, for now more than 4 decades, interacting with the European civil, economical, juridical and political society only through democratical means. All the rights debated, obtained or rejected have been issued by a democratic process.

Democratic European Muslims, what is their perspective?

It has to be noted also that other examples of civic causes in Europe have not always been as peaceful as the European Muslims have been: the left wing movements or the altermondialist movement for example have been into much more violent riots and acts (there is not any G8 or G20 meeting that has not been the occasion to massive vandalism), but as it is not “ethnically tagged”, it was always been much more accepted. The altermondialist leader José Bové, currently representing Europe Ecology in the European Parliament has started his political career in destroying a transgenic culture field and a McDonald’s. Such acts, labelled in Europe as “civic desobediance” seem to never be applied to European Muslims: if one of them would act like José Bové, he would be labelled as violent and retrograde; very aware of this, the huge majority of the Muslim community in Europe generally act extremely peacefully and carefully, to not harm the global cause. It is this concern of the global cause that opens the European Muslims to questions wider than their own personnal benefit in the present situation.

In some extent, the European-Muslims have influenced the generation of their parents, bringing them to the fight for their rights that have been denied to them. So is the case of the African Second World War veterans, without any official recognition nor descent wages until the young generation revealed their history on the screens and medias, or the ongoing case of the 50s-60s Moroccan railway workers underpayed and discriminated. This kind of “retroactive” democratic influence isn’t surprising: the generation of muslims born in Europe, in many aspects, acts like an interface between their parents and the host country, due to a better educational background, a better knowledge of the language and of political institutions, etc.

The current economical crisis also resulted in a rise of the right-wing parties all over Europe, achieving to reveal this growing rift between the European-Muslims, as descendants of migrants, and the non-muslim Europeans: the word islamophobia became unfortunately very common. The growing general islamophobic feeling results in a hardening in legislations: ban of minarets in Switzerland being only one example. In today’s Europe, where racist behaviours and opinions are becoming more and more normal (not only against muslims but also against other migrants, like the gipsies), the European-Muslims seem to be an isolated case of civic struggle through the decades for rights. Now, they are in a new unseen situation: they have to fight against the loss of the rights they won only years ago. For example, after making some progress in the fight against discriminations in the 80s and 90s, we see now a rise of openly discriminating behaviour. The fight for equality is never won for good; maybe it has only begun.

The North African and Middle East is living now a turn in its History: the Tunisian and Egyptian popular revolutions opened the path to democracy to the whole region. It might take years, but it is clear now that people are fighting for their rights and for the end of an unfair society. The parallel here is interesting: a Europe in loss of democracy, an Arab World in progress towards democracy. And as a link between them this generation of young European people from Arab migrant parents, and most specifically from Arab Muslim parents (as Muslims not only account for the huge majority of Arabs in Europe, especially because of the Maghrebi migration, but also they had to face much more discriminations due to their religion, giving them more expertise in the fight for justice). The Arab (Muslim) Europeans have been following with interest the events since the beginning. They felt extremely proud of the Arab youth fighting for their freedom. Amongst governments, the recent events in the Arab World were paid a high attention for geostrategic reasons, but also because of the repercussion it might have on those European Muslims: as an example, French President Sarkozy clearly avoided to welcome Ben Ali after his fall down, fearing to  ignite an unrest among the Muslim community in France.

The situation might evolve to a surprising scenario: if we reach a point where Europe offers less freedom and rights to their Muslim citizens than the Arab countries, they might massively  migrate back to Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, etc. Their parents came to Europe, they might go back to North Africa and Middle East. We are already witnessing for a couple of years now an increasing number of young European Muslims working in opening business in their country of origin, transfering their expertise into the local market, creating partnerships, bringing ideas not yet implemented in the Arab World. Many times we hear from young people, born in France, UK, Switzerland or Germany: “Why wouldn’t my arab country of origin benefit from all I can bring instead of Europe that day by day denies me the right to express my personnality, my culture, my religion?”.  The point here is to understand that they do not come back to the Arab World because they have no choice (having European citizenships protects them quite enough), but because they make the choice to give their added value to the country of origin. Moroccans, Tunisians, Algerians, Libyans, Egyptians, etc, that know the beginning will be difficult for them to adapt, but that want to make it. They know they are certainly going to earn less, but to live better, whilst they will participate in the local and global progress. Their parents were part of an economical migration wave, they are part of a ethical migration wave. Many of them, anyway, won’t migrate “physically” and will continue to live in Europe, but with a greatest concern of their civil role in Arab societies: most of this European Arabs carry european citizenships, but also arab citizenships, giving them the right to vote, to own in the country of origin or to represent it in International Organizations.

The European Arab (Muslim) youth and the Arab youth have many in common: education level, global awareness, similar values, similar goals and a great concern for democracy, human rights, civic rights. It would be interesting if they can benefit from each other’s experience and collaborate together to build a better and fair society, in Europe as well as in the Arab world. One one side they would fight corruption of the system, on the other side they would fight unethical exploitation of workers and ressources, in a situation that would guarantee a stable peaceful relation based on mutual benefit. They could meet in forums, establish partnerships, NGOs, transnational cooperations, exchange knowledge and open markets to each other, advise each other.

That would be a new nice kind of globalization.

What educated people should learn from uneducated people

Education is the key. For everything: development, peace, health, freedom, democracy, human rights, end of racism and discrimination, global awareness, etc. It is with this leitmotiv that most of parents of arab/african migrants to Europe crossed the Mediterranean Sea: to offer to their children the oppprtunity to live in a stable environment where an education of high value is given. Studies show that the difference in education level between migrants and their children is bigger than for natives. Other studies show also that the migrant parents tend to be even more pushy with their daughters than with their sons to accomplish a grade in higher education.

Good news? Yes awesome news, but one little bad point, though. I started to notice a long ago that in general (of course this is not a general statement) that if I look around me for people like me, sons and daughters of migrant arab parents, that the higher the education level of parents is, especially the mother, the lower is the ability of their children to speak in arabic. To be more accurate, I came to the statement that this was particularely true for two categories of migrants: those coming from maghrebi coutries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and from Lebanon. One big exception though: it is false mainly for Syrians, for every Syrian born in Europe I’ve met, they were all speaking perfectly arabic. To illustrate my point, I remember this video I’ve seen long ago of the son of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri talking in front of the Lebanese Parliament, reading from a paper his speech written in arabic, with such a hesitant, with so many mistakes that the video was widely spread among Arabs. It seemed so incredible to see the son of such a famous businessman and politician, long depicted as a figure of success in the Arab world, owning even arabic speaking medias, having difficulty and making mistakes.

So the question is: why among the Arab diaspora in Europe the more (in general) moroccan/algerian/tunisian/lebanese parents are educated, the less children are able to speak arabic (not even mentionning writing)? For those who don’t live the diaspora from inside, it has to be pointed out that arabic inside arab communities in Europe is almost exclusively transmitted to children by parents, the small number of arabic courses for children being far from having the capacity of welcoming everybody (and do not even exist in every city). Anyway arabic courses do not help children to really speak arabic, I mean the arabic they would be able to speak with their family and friends, since fus’ha (classical standard arabic) is mostly used for writing; the speaking requires knowledge of local dialectical arabic (including berber languages even if of course strictly saying they are different from arabic) that can’t be transmitted by any other mean than listening and speaking on a regular basis.

It seems to be a total contradiction to imagine that a less educated father and/or a less educated mother are more likely to teach their children arabic. Actually, if you carefully analyze the situation it is not: the four country I mentionned, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Lebanon, have in common a very high tendency to value french culture. In these countries, intellectual elites tend to speak french, even when they are not together with a foreigner not speaking arabic. When you think of it, it is very absurd to be arabic native speaker born in an arabic country, going to school and losing a little bit touch with arabic (for example sciences are tought in french in high schools in Tunisia, lebanese authors like Khalil Gibran or Andrée Cheddid wrote in english or french instead of arabic), meeting your significant other and getting married, migrating to Europe and having kids (not necesseraly in that order) and… forget to speak arabic with them.On the contrary, so many of us, sons and daughters of migrant parents with lower schooling level remember speaking one language at school (english, french, german) and coming back home switching instantly to arabic. (For my case,  for example, my father being egyptian and my mother tunisian, I was trained to switch instantly not only between french and arabic but also between dialectal egyptian and tunisian.)

Is it because they have been themselves to school that they are more keen to rely on school to ensure fully the linguistic education? Or maybe because education paradigms in their native countries have succeeded in implementing the idea that arabic was not so useful after all compared to something as prestigious and succesful as english or french, and that it is not a big loss that their children didn’t learn it? Or because less educated parents are less fluent in other languages than arabic, “forcing” children to keep talking in arabic with them if they want to communicate? Or because less graduated parents equals to less takening careers or a more “traditionnal type” family, then more free time dedicated to children? Certainly a mix of all these different reasons.

Anyway, this appeals to an interesting conlusion: there is certainly something educated people should learn from less educated people. They should give a bigger attention to what they transmit to their child. Parents transmit education, values, but when they are migrants they transmit also culture and language. They are the essential and sometimes the unique link for their children with their country of origin. If they want their children to “feel at home” back there, there is no other option: they cannot chose the easy path. It is twice as difficult, but worth it.